An exploited OpenSSH flaw lets a very long password log in to accounts that have no password. It only hits sshd built on musl libc without PAM, such as Alpine Linux. Most mainstream Linux servers are not affected.
Check if you’re affectedCVE-2026-123158 is an OpenSSH password-authentication bypass that only affects sshd built on musl libc without PAM, such as Alpine Linux, OpenWrt, Buildroot and Yocto systems. Ubuntu, Red Hat, SUSE and Amazon Linux say their builds are not affected. OpenSSH 10.6p2 fixes it, and CISA lists it as exploited.
CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 9, 2026. The quickest stopgap is turning off SSH password logins.
The flaw depends on the C library sshd is built on and whether it uses PAM, not on the OpenSSH version alone. Each row says whose statement it is.
| System | C library / PAM | Affected? | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Alpine Linux with openssh-server |
musl, built without PAM | Yes, if the account conditions below are met. Update to the fixed package. | Alpine advisory |
Alpine Linux with openssh-server-pam |
musl, PAM | Only if UsePAM no is set |
Alpine advisory |
| OpenWrt, Buildroot, Yocto and musl-based Docker images running OpenSSH’s sshd | musl, usually without PAM | Likely, if password logins are on. Check your build. | Researcher (sshhole.com); Medcrypt reproduced it on a stock Yocto image |
| Ubuntu (14.04 to 26.10) | glibc, PAM | No | Ubuntu CVE tracker |
| Debian | glibc, PAM | Debian’s tracker lists bookworm and trixie as vulnerable and forky/sid as fixed (1:10.6p2-1). The researcher says glibc systems, including Debian, are not affected. | Debian security tracker; researcher |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux, SUSE, Amazon Linux | glibc, PAM | No | Red Hat, SUSE and AWS CVE pages |
| OpenBSD, and SSH servers using Dropbear | — | No | Researcher (sshhole.com) |
openssh-server package, or UsePAM no); PasswordAuthentication is yes (the default); an account has * as its password field in /etc/shadow; and at least one other local account has a $5$ or $6$ password hash. Locked accounts (!) are not affected.
alpine user with a * password field and passwordless doas. They are safe on first boot but become exploitable once any $6$ password hash exists on the machine. Images built from 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8, 3.24.4 and later include the fix.
A failed password check on musl returns the same string that marks an account with no password.
NVD describes CVE-2026-123158 this way: sshd in OpenSSH before 10.6p2 on Linux, when musl libc is used without PAM, lacks a workaround for a password authentication bypass. For some account configurations, any password between 256 and 1,024 characters succeeds.
The researcher, Özgün Kültekin of Wakefield, explains the cause. Since 2012, musl’s crypt() returns "*" when it fails instead of returning nothing, and its SHA-512 crypt fails on passwords over 256 bytes. Key-only and service accounts often have * in /etc/shadow. Without PAM, sshd compares the two strings, sees a match and lets the login through. The researcher notes that a wrong attempt has to come first, which is one reason the bug went unnoticed.
OpenSSH’s release notes say the root cause is outside sshd but it is exploitable through sshd and can be avoided there, which is what 10.6p2 does. MITRE, as the CVE numbering authority, scores it 8.1 (High), CVSS 3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. NVD has not published its own score yet.
Portable OpenSSH 10.6p2 (November 5, 2026) is the upstream fix. Alpine backported it to every supported branch (3.21 to 3.24) and to the unsupported 3.16 to 3.20.
| Alpine branch | Fixed openssh package |
|---|---|
| edge | 10.6_p2-r0 |
| 3.24 | 10.3_p1-r2 |
| 3.23 | 10.2_p1-r1 |
| 3.22 | 10.0_p1-r11 |
| 3.21 | 9.9_p2-r1 |
| 3.20 | 9.7_p1-r6 |
| 3.19 | 9.6_p1-r3 |
| 3.18 | 9.3_p2-r4 |
| 3.17 | 9.1_p1-r7 |
| 3.16 | 9.0_p1-r6 |
Alpine’s advisory gives these commands. Upgrading the package does not replace the running daemon, so the restart matters.
apk upgrade -U -a
rc-service sshd restart
For OpenWrt, Buildroot, Yocto and container images, rebuild on OpenSSH 10.6p2 or a vendor package that includes the fix, then redeploy.
Commands marked “general” are standard Linux tools, not steps from Alpine or OpenSSH.
From Alpine’s advisory. Run as root. If this prints passwordauthentication no and no Match block sets it to yes, password logins are off.
sshd -T | grep -i passwordauthentication
If the output lists ld-musl, sshd uses musl libc. Run as root. On Alpine, check whether the PAM build is installed and whether UsePAM is set.
ldd /usr/sbin/sshd
apk info -e openssh-server-pam
grep -ri '^[[:space:]]*usepam' /etc/ssh/sshd_config /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/ 2>/dev/null
Compare the version with the table above.
apk info -v openssh-server
The first command lists accounts with * as the password field; the second lists accounts with a $5$ or $6$ hash. Run as root.
awk -F: '$2=="*"{print $1}' /etc/shadow
awk -F: '$2 ~ /^\$[56]\$/{print $1}' /etc/shadow
If you can’t update yet, Alpine and the researcher both recommend disabling SSH password authentication.
The researcher’s version uses a drop-in file. Alpine’s advisory also edits /etc/ssh/sshd_config and keeps a backup; follow its exact commands on Alpine. The drop-in directory is read only on Alpine 3.19 and later, and a PasswordAuthentication yes inside a Match block in the main config still applies. Alpine’s commands handle both.
echo "PasswordAuthentication no" > /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-no-passwords.conf
sshd -t
rc-service sshd restart
sshd -T | grep -i passwordauthentication
The last line should print passwordauthentication no. Turning off password logins is good practice for internet-facing SSH anyway; keep it after you update.
Updating closes the hole. It doesn’t tell you whether someone already used it.
/var/log/messages for sshd lines reading Accepted password for followed by an account with no password, such as alpine, root or a key-only user.doas use, recently created users, new files and changes to authorized_keys.The researcher also publishes a checker at github.com/oz9un/sshole.
GreyNoise documented one attacker cluster (it calls it GT10) after a successful login on one of its sensors. Indicators are defanged:
/opt/py3/tac_agent.py and /usr/local/bin/tac_agent.py, with config in /root/.config/tac/agent.json/etc/init.d/tac-agenttac[.]vpnla[.]org, pinned in a modified /etc/hosts| Date (2026) | Event |
|---|---|
| November 5 | OpenSSH 10.6p2 released; Alpine advisory and fixed packages; disclosure on the oss-security list; NVD publishes the CVE. GreyNoise says exploit code appeared on GitHub at 13:16 UTC. |
| November 7 | GreyNoise records the first successful exploitation of one of its sensors, at 00:46 UTC. |
| November 9 | CISA adds CVE-2026-123158 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. |
| November 12 | CISA remediation due date for US federal civilian agencies. |
The exploit works through SSH password authentication, so any server that exposes sshd password logins to the internet is reachable. Limiting who can reach port 22, for example through a VPN or a firewall rule that allows only known addresses, and using key-only logins reduce exposure to this flaw and the next one. The SSH brute force protection guide covers key-only authentication, fail2ban and CrowdSec. ThreatListPro’s list comes from real attacks on live production Palo Alto GlobalProtect VPN portals in the US, so it is not an SSH-specific feed, and no block list fixes CVE-2026-123158: update OpenSSH.
Yes. Exploit code was published on November 5, 2026, and GreyNoise saw the first successful exploitation of one of its sensors on November 7, 2026. CISA added CVE-2026-123158 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 9, 2026, with a November 12 due date for US federal agencies.
Ubuntu, Red Hat, SUSE and Amazon Linux say their OpenSSH packages are not affected: they use glibc and PAM. Debian’s security tracker lists the openssh packages in bookworm and trixie as vulnerable and fixed in forky and sid (1:10.6p2-1). The researcher who found the flaw says glibc systems, including Debian, are not affected.
Portable OpenSSH 10.6p2, released November 5, 2026. Alpine backported the fix to every supported branch (3.21 to 3.24) and to the unsupported 3.16 to 3.20: for example openssh 10.3_p1-r2 on Alpine 3.24, 10.2_p1-r1 on 3.23 and 10.0_p1-r11 on 3.22. Restart sshd after upgrading, because the running daemon keeps the old code.
Yes. Turn off SSH password logins with PasswordAuthentication no, then restart sshd and confirm the setting with sshd -T. Make sure key-based login works first, and keep your current session open while you test a new one, so you don’t lock yourself out.
On musl libc, crypt() returns the string "*" when it fails, and musl’s SHA-512 crypt fails on passwords over 256 bytes. Accounts with no usable password, such as key-only users, often have "*" in /etc/shadow. Without PAM, sshd compares the two, finds a match and accepts the login.
Only containers that run OpenSSH’s sshd on a musl-based image, such as an Alpine image, with password logins enabled. Most containers don’t run an SSH server at all. Rebuild affected images on a fixed openssh package rather than patching running containers.
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